Global financial crisis and foreign development assistance shocks in least developing countries by Das, Debasish Kumar & Dutta, Champa Bati
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Global financial crisis and foreign
development assistance shocks in least
developing countries
Debasish Kumar Das and Champa Bati Dutta
The University of Bonn
22. March 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40281/
MPRA Paper No. 40281, posted 27. July 2012 06:25 UTC
[1] 
 
 
Global Financial Crisis and Foreign Development Assistance Shocks in 
Least Developing Countries 
Debasish Kumar Das  
Department of Economics, The University of Bonn, Germany 
Email: deba_econ@yahoo.com/s6dedass@uni-bonn.de 
 
 
Champa Bati Dutta 
Department of Economics, Khulna University, Bangladesh 
Email: puja_econ@yahoo.com 
 
Abstract:  
This paper evaluates whether the exogenous component of the global financial crisis affects OECD-
DAC EU donor countries ODA disbursements to the LDCs and how it impacts on LDCs economic 
prosperity. Using both static and dynamic panel techniques, we find that global financial crisis in 
OECD-EU donor countries are causes for the significant downside of ODA flows to the LDCs. 
Consequently it adversely affects through the various transmission channels (e.g. ODA 
disbursements, remittances, bilateral financial flows, export growth) to the LDCs economic growth. 
Our results also explore that due to countercyclical role of ODA flows from the donors’ largely affect 
to the LDCs economic development process negatively. The robustness checks using alternative 
estimation technique supports our original estimation results in every context.  
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1 Introduction 
Foreign development assistance, widely known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), is the 
most prominent development tool employed by the developed countries in its attempts to promote 
prosperity in the developing countries. Since the Second World War, ODA has become an 
institutionalized part of foreign policy of donors which accounts for an important source of many 
developing countries’ fiscal income (Grant & Nijman, 1998).  Several studies (Ang, 2010; C.  Burnside 
& Dollar, 2000; W. Easterly, 2003; William Easterly, Levine, & Roodman, 2004; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; 
Karras, 2006; Rajan & Subramanian, 2005) have already widely explored the impact of ODA on the 
Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) economic growth. Some researchers have stated that ODA flows 
also affects the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into developing countries, as donors always 
encourage the improvement of the recipient countries’ FDI (Kimura & Todo, 2010; OECD, 2004).  
Although the ODA’s impact on developing countries’ growth remains a subject for further 
investigation, developing countries, in particular LDCs directly need foreign aid for their economic 
development.  
 
The recent financial crisis in the advanced economies has impacted LDCs heavily resulting in 
reduced private financial flows and foreign aid, falling worker remittances and lower demand and 
hence falling prices of the export goods.  Consequently, these shocks have reduced LDCs income 
growth rate by about 7 percent between 2007 and 2009 (Dang, Knack, & Rogers, 2009). Since LDCs 
resources do not allow them to recover from these shocks by adopting fiscal stimulus packages like 
the developed countries, ODA plays an important role to save them.   In addition, ODA is mostly 
connected with the development activities through some important sectors (e.g. infrastructure, 
health, education, etc). Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the financial crisis has 
affected ODA. If it proves to affect it then, it will be essential to investigate whether a sudden cut of 
ODA disbursements will aggravate the problems already imposed by the crisis and further hinder the 
development process of these poor economies as a whole. Bulir and Hamann (2008), Treasurry 
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(2005), Birdsall (2004), OECD (2003)and many others highlighted that volatility and 
unpredictability of ODA shocks is a severe macroeconomic management problem to the LDCs.  
 
There is a dearth of  studies (Bulir & Hamann, 2008; Dang et al., 2009; Frot, 2009; Mendoza, Jones, & 
Vergara, 2009; Minoiu, Zanna, & Dabla-Norris, 2010; Mold, Prizzon, Frot, & Santiso, 2010)  that 
examine the effects of the financial crisis on donor countries ODA flows.  Dang et al. (2009) points 
out that crisis affected donor countries have reduced their ODA flows by an average of 20 to 25 
percent and bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis; Roodman (2008), Frot (2009) 
argue that the recent financial crisis will slump the ODA flows. This is supported by the reduction of 
ODA disbursements following to the Nordic financial crisis in 1990’s. He reports that Nordic banking 
crisis reduce donors’ aid disbursements by 13 percent. Conversely, Pallage and Robe (2001), Mold et 
al. (2010) claims that the financial crisis and donor countries economic growth does not impact on 
ODA disbursements and which may not have any negative impact on the developing economics. 
However, the empirical evidences, methodologies and analyses of the above studies are not 
sufficiently rigorous.  
 
This research rigorously examines whether the exogenous component of the global financial crisis 
affects OECD-DAC EU donor countries ODA disbursements to the LDCs and how it impacts on LDCs 
economic prosperity. Methodologically, our research uses two econometric techniques: firstly, static 
panel estimators and secondly, dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. 
We also run various specification tests to check the validity of the models and subsequently employ 
the alternative econometric techniques to check the robustness of our models. We comprise various 
yearly data for 17 OECD-DAC EU donor countries and 53 LDCs between 2004 and 2010. Our results 
suggest that global financial crisis in OECD-EU donor countries declines their ODA effort to the LDCs. 
Consequently it adversely affects through the various transmission channels (e.g. ODA 
disbursements, remittances, bilateral financial flows, export growth) to the LDCs economic 
development.  
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The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: section 2 lays out the stylized facts of 
global financial crisis and FDA shocks in least developing countries; section 3 presents data and 
empirical strategy, while section 4 discuss and presents the static and dynamic panel estimation 
results, and section 5 contains the conclusion.  
2 Stylized facts 
2.1 Global financial crisis and development assistance shocks 
The current global financial crisis was initially triggered through the bursting of the United States 
housing bubble in 2007.  Soon after, in September 2008 the EU financial turmoil erupts and 
contagion over the EU member countries, referred to is now as the so called global financial crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) shows that, aftermath of this severe financial crises in rich countries 
asset markets are collapsed and prolonged,  output and employment level declines profoundly and 
government debt tends to explode. Consequently, to mitigate and tackle the crises, OECD-DAC in 
particular EU countries adopt the fiscal austerity measures, which are potentially affecting of their 
ODA flows to the LDCs. Some donors have already cut their aid expenditure in terms of aid volumes1 
and aid programming2 (te Velde & Massa, 2009), while OECD (2010) estimates to meet the donors’ 
2010 ODA commitments at least 10-15 billion US$ must be added to their ODA spending plans.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 e.g. Ireland by 24 percent, Italy 56 percent, Greece 32 percent, Denmark 11 percent and the Netherlands 11 
percent.  
2 e.g. Germany, France, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands are changing their aid allocations program to 
the different countries. 
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Figure 2.1: Scenario of intensified financial stress in Euro area  
 
[Source: IMF Economic outlook database] 
Notes: This graph depicts the output gap, general government fiscal balance and general government 
lending/browning in the Euro area from 2004 to 2010 (from 2011 to 2015 is the IMF forecast). Evidence shows 
that the Euro area suffers deep economic recession from 2007 and onward, which is the causes of global 
financial crisis.  
   
However, Sèna Kimm (2011), Jones (2011), Dang, Knack, and Rogers (2010), Faini (2006) explore  
how the fiscal conditions of OECD donors affects their aid effort to the developing countries. They 
finds that crisis affected donor countries reduce their aid flows by an average of 20 to 25 percent. 
Additionally, they reports that aid flows is related to donors’ fiscal situation.  Whereas Mendoza et al. 
(2009) shows that financial and economic crisis has a negative link to the ODA disbursements by 
using USA ODA disbursements from 1967-2007. Conversely, Mold et al. (2010) demonstrates crisis 
does not impact on aid flows. Since limited numbers of studies have dealt with the supply side 
perspective of donor ODA flows, these different empirical works did not sufficiently explore the real 
picture of OECD-DAC ODA flows to the most ODA dependent low income counties after financial 
crises, while they consider all OECD-DAC donors ODA flows to the developing countries (including 
the emerging economies) as a whole. Therefore, there is no supporting evidence in this regard, 
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which makes our research more essential. Here we consider only crisis affected regions’ OECD-DAC 
donor countries and their supply side determinants of ODA disbursements only to the LDCs. 
 
Figure 2.2: Scatter-plot matrix of OECD-DAC EU donors’ major economic indicators    
 
Figure 2.2 exhibits a scatter-plot matrix of OECD-DAC EU donor countries major economic indicators 
(e.g. ODA flows to the LDCs, public debt, output gap and government fiscal balance), which appears 
to show a strong relationship between these variables. Our figures3 (Figure 2.3) present the net ODA 
disbursements by the 17 OECD-EU donor countries to the 53 LDCs during pre and post financial 
crises4. It clearly postulates that most of the OECD-EU donors’ countries net ODA flows reduced 
substantially since 2007, e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom (UK).  If we look before 2007, these EU donors’ net 
ODA flows were gradually increased to the LDCs’ in terms of their commitments. According to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) evidence, our figures (see Appendix) show that the severe crisis affected 
donor countries public debt and general government fiscal balance tend to explode since 2008.  
                                                          
3 Figures are computed by using the OECD-DAC database on net ODA disbursements by OECD-EU donor 
countries to the LDCs, OECD-EU donors’ public debt and general government fiscal balance (see Appendix).  
4 We use data from 2004 -2010. 
Net official
development
assistance
disbursed by
each donor to
LDC
Donor
countries
goverment
debt (% of
GDP)
Donor
countries
output gap
(% of GDP)
Donor
countries
general
government
fiscal
balance
0
2000
4000
6000
0 2000 4000 6000
0
50
100
150
0 50 100 150
-10
0
10
-10 0 10
-200
-100
0
100
-200 -100 0 100
[7] 
 
Thus, our evidence demonstrates that before the crisis started EU donors net ODA flows to the LDCs 
was consistent and upward with respect to their fiscal conditions but the following the crisis most of 
the EU donors’ public debt soared and their net ODA disbursements decreased sharply. 
[8] 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  OECD-EU donor countries net foreign development assistance disbursements to LDCs 
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2.2 Development assistance shocks and least developing countries 
In the decade prior to the global financial catastrophe, bilateral ODA disbursements to the 
developing countries consistently increased; as a result the crisis raised big concerns that ODA 
supply would decline (Dang et al., 2009; Frot, 2009; Minoiu et al., 2010). However,  developing 
countries, in particular LDCs are now experiencing the magnitude of the global financial turmoil, 
which hit hard primarily their private capital flows, ODA and remittances, trade revenue and many 
others macroeconomic variables.  These transmission channels primarily evolve through reduced 
ODA disbursements, export growth, private capital flows and workers’ remittances flows to the 
LDCs, which put them from frying pan into the fire. Consequently, these transmission mechanisms 
have induced broad adverse macroeconomic effects to the LDC’s economy, for instance; growth, 
investment, poverty, inequality, public and private debt and so on. Bulir and Hamann (2008)  
demonstrates that aid dependent countries heavily suffer from the external shocks and due to the 
widespread liquidity constraint they are less able to absorb those shocks.   
Figure 2.4: GDP growth by country groups    
  
[Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database] 
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Notes: This graph reflects the quarterly GDP growth rate from 2007 to 2010 of global economies, emerging 
and developing economies and advanced economies. It shows that the financial crisis in advanced economies 
rapidly affects to the emerging and developing countries GDP growth rate through various transmission 
channels. Although developing countries, in particular the LDCs may not have played any role for this big 
recession, but they are severely affected through the global market actions.  
 
Furthermore,  ActionAid (2009) estimates that low income countries export growth decline almost 
25 percent in side-by-side financial resources to around US$ 300 billion (Cali, Massa, & te Velde, 
2008; Naudé & Research, 2009). Dang et al. (2009) show that developing countries income growth 
rate is reduced by about 7 percent between 2007 and 2009. In terms of ODA, the Doha Monetary 
Consensus meeting in 20085 revealed that most of the OECD-DAC donors could not meet their aid 
commitment6 to the developing countries (Cali et al., 2008; Naudé & Research, 2009). Subsequently, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows decreased by 10 percent in 2008 (UNCTAD, 2009) as well as 
workers remittance flows being reduced considerably. Thus, it is obvious that developing countries, 
particularly LDCs economic growth and development are in difficulty after the financial crisis and 
economic recession of 2008 and 2009 in donor countries.    
LDCs are already severely affected by the global financial crisis and additional ODA cuts put them 
more miserable situations, where over 50 percent people lives under the poverty line7. Most 
importantly, LDCs are far behind to reach United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) e.g.  
poverty reduction, education, health, environment, economic growth and so on, thus ODA shocks 
potentially a big threat to their development progress. Our figures (see Appendix) portray that the 
LDCs’ (e.g. Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Rep., Chad, Kenya, Haiti, Laos, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Tajikistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, 
Yemen  and so on) worker remittances, debt forgiveness reduction, export growth and bilateral 
financial flows decline substantially since the financial crisis of EU donor countries, on the other 
hand in this period  most of the LDCs’ affected by different types of severe natural disaster as well.  
                                                          
5 OECD-DAC follows up international conference on financing for development to review the implementation of 
the monetary consensus in Doha, Qatar, December 2008. 
6 In 2002, monetary consensus on financing for development OECD-DAC donor countries have agreed to 
provide at least 0.7 percent of their GNP as aid to the developing countries. 
7 See UNFPA (2011) 
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Moreover, Figure 2.5 presents a scatter-plot matrix of the LDCs’ per capita economic growth, net 
ODA disbursements from OECD-DAC EU donor countries, debt forgiveness reduction, net bilateral 
financial flows, export growth rate and foreign direct investments. This graph shows that net ODA 
disbursements from OECD-DAC EU donor countries, debt forgiveness reduction, net bilateral 
financial flows, export growth rate and foreign direct investments have a strong link with the LDCs 
per capita economic growth. Thus this stylized fact confirms us to investigate how ODA and other 
financial flows shock affect to the LDCs.   
Figure 2.5: Scatter-plot matrix of the LDCs major economic indicators    
 
2.3 Shortcomings of exiting examination 
There is a few number of  studies (Bulir & Hamann, 2008; Dang et al., 2009; Frot, 2009; Mendoza et 
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donor countries ODA flows. However, the empirical evidences, methodologies and analyses of these 
studies are not sufficiently rigorous.   Roodman (2008) and Mold et al. (2010) study are more 
discussion oriented and provides less empirical evidence regarding their hypotheses. Furthermore, 
Roodman (2008) does not show any further analysis of ODA disbursements of donor countries after 
the effects of Nordic financial crisis. Frot (2009) estimates panel data of donor countries using vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. He mainly considers a long time series data along with banking crises 
data, consequently the results do not exhibits the actual evidence of the recent global financial crisis. 
Besides, they do not verify their specification using alternative estimations for robustness checks 
and sensitivity of the results. Minoiu et al. (2010) and Dang et al. (2009) estimate panel data using 
fixed effects estimation. The weakness of their paper is the credibility of specification as they only 
employed fixed effects techniques. Since, endogeneity is a big issue for panel data analysis, they 
ignores the necessary specification tests to examine the correlation between regressors and 
unobserved country-specific effects.  Moreover, they do not carried out any other estimation 
techniques even for the robustness checks of their obtained specifications. Furthermore, Mendoza et 
al. (2009) uses only U.S. ODA disbursements data (1967-2007) for their estimations and ignores the 
other OECD donor countries, thus their results does not portrait the comprehensive effects on ODA 
flows to the recipient countries.  Most importantly, none of these researches account for the impact 
of ODA shocks to the LDCs, where the world poorest people are living.  
3 Data and Empirical strategy 
To analyze these issues we employ a robust econometric technique which directly deals with the 
potential biases induced by omitted variables, simultaneity and unobserved country specific effects.  
Methodologically, we have used both static and dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM) 
panel estimation procedure. To use these techniques we have set up two models: (1) for OECD-EU 
donor countries and (2) for LDCs. We assemble the panel data set of 17 countries from donor 
perspective and 53 countries from recipient perspective. To address the question concerning the 
first model, the dependent variable is the log of net ODA disbursements, whereas for second model, 
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it is the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The explanatory variables of both model 
contains a large set of variables which serves as conditioning information.     
3.1 Data 
We consider two panel data sets from the complementary points of view of the donor countries and 
of the recipient countries. Our sample covers the period 2004-2010. For our first panel we limit 
sources counties to the 17 OECD-DAC EU donor countries, since EU donor countries are severely 
affected by the financial crisis. And for our second panel we limit sources to the 53 Least Developed 
Countries, whose economic development is largely, depends upon Foreign Development Assistance 
(FDA) received from donor countries.  
3.1.1 Donor countries data 
Our first hypothesis is to examine whether the exogenous component if the financial crisis affects 
OECD-EU donor countries ODA disbursements to the LDCs. Data for OECD-EU donor countries are 
taken from EuroStat, OECD-DAC, database8, which are the standard sources used in empirical 
research. Our data set represents strongly balanced panel of 119 observations and 17 countries for 
the period 2004-2010 each.  
We considered Net Official Developed Assistance (ODA) disbursement instead of ODA commitments 
by each donor to the developing countries, as there was a wide gap between ODA commitments and 
ODA disbursements by each donor in the data sets.  For banking crisis data, we used a database 
developed by Luc Leaven9.  From this, we considered the banking crisis events after 2004, since most 
of the EU donor countries were affected by the financial crisis after this time period. We suspect 
banking crisis in a donor country is one of the major channels to reduce the ODA disbursements 
irrespective of its effect on the other macroeconomic variables.  We also consider budget deficit and 
public debt (DPD), output gap (DOG), general government fiscal balance (DGGFB), trade openness 
(TOP), GDP per capita (GDPC), population (Pop), real effective exchange rate (RER), rate of inflation 
                                                          
8 See Appendix Table A3 for detail descriptions of variables and sources. 
9See  http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm 
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(INF) and rate of unemployment (UE) data, which are affect to the ODA flows to the LDCs. Table 3.1 
represents summary statistics of OECD EU donor countries variables used in the estimation. 
Table 3.1 OECD-EU donor countries summary statistics  
Variable Variable description Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
LNDODA Log of net ODA 119 6.23 1.29 2.21 8.70 
DPD Public debt (% of GDP) 119 51.18 29.96 0.82 147.84 
DOG Output gap (% of GDP) 119 -0.24 3.01 -8.90 6.70 
DGGFB General government fiscal balance 119 17.54 58.01 -165.90 115.50 
Lpop Log of total population 119 9.40 1.28 6.14 11.32 
Lgdpc Log of GDP per capita  119 10.66 0.38 9.78 11.68 
Lue Log of unemployment rate  119 1.84 0.40 0.92 3.00 
Ltop Log of trade openness  119 4.50 0.46 3.87 5.77 
Lrer Log of Real exchange rate (with $) 119 0.10 0.82 -0.69 2.04 
Linf Log of inflation  111 0.60 0.68 -2.30 1.55 
bcdummy   Banking crisis dummy 119 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
3.1.2 Developing countries data 
To address our second research hypothesis- investigate how ODA and other financial flows shock 
affect to the LDCs., we consider 53 Least Developing Countries (LDC)10. In fact, we restrict our 
attention only to the LDCs, since these world’s most poor cohort countries are facing several 
challenges due to the global financial crisis, which include huge debt burden, very limited inflows of 
FDI, low rate of ODA and remittance inflows, less participation in export and so on.  
 
For our strongly balanced panel for 53 LDCs represents 371 observations for the time period 2004-
2010. We used data from various sources, including the Penn World Tables 7.011 , OECD-DAC , Global 
Development Finance Report (2012), World Bank, IMF-International Financial Statistics, 
WIDER, ILO-Labor market statistics, Migration and Remittances Factbook (2011) and 
Emergency events database12.  For this Panel dataset, GDP per capita growth rate treats as a 
dependent variable.  We consider net total ODA flows rather than ODA commitments from the OECD-
                                                          
10 Treated as low income and lower middle income countries according to the World Bank’s classifications in 
1990s. 
11 See http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
12 See Appendix Table A3 for detail descriptions of variables and sources. 
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EU donor countries to the ODA recipient countries. Since, European Union (EU) member countries 
are severely affected by global financial crisis, thus we also restrict our attention only to the OECD-
EU donor countries ODA flows. The other explanatory variables include net FDI inflows, export 
growth, debt forgiveness or reduction, total external debt stocks, corruption index, inequality (GINI 
index), total population, net bilateral financial flows, net multilateral financial flows, macroeconomic 
management rating, numbers of natural disasters affected, exchange rate, workers’ remittances, 
infant mortality rate and fiscal policy rating also taken into consideration, which serves as 
conditioning information. Table 3.2, represents the summary statistics of the variables.    
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Table 3.2 LDCs summary statistics  
Variable Variable description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RGPCG GDP per capita growth (annual %) 371 3.093 6.282 -14.421 101.134 
FDInf Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows (% of GDP)  371 4.570 6.339 -4.578 46.829 
ExG Export growth (% of GDP) 371 3.95 37.71 -632 193.26 
DFoR Debt forgiveness or reduction (current US$) 371 -230000000 948000000 -10900000000 0 
TEDS Total external debt stocks, (DOD, current US$) 371 5010000000 7.97E+09 5.632085 56800000000 
CI Corruption index (1=low to 6=high) 371 2.78 0.63 1.5 4.5 
GINI Inequality (GINI  Index) 371 41.92 7.79 27.5 64.3 
Pop Total population 371 23700000 36300000 150311 174000000 
NFF_Bi Net financial flows, bilateral (NFL, current US$) 371 25200000 365000000 -4340000000 3370000000 
NFF_Mu Net financial flows, multilateral (NFL, current US$) 371 128000000 270000000 -563000000 2220000000 
MMR Macroeconomic management rating 1=low  to 6=high) 371 3.72 0.67 2 5.5 
AND Aid recipient countries people affected by disasters 371 2.52 2.48 0 14 
ODA Net total ODA flows from the OECD-EU donor and EU 
institutions (current US$) 
371 376.51 621.02 -48.17 8534.94 
XR Exchange rate 371 1644.14 3740.52 0.90 18612.92 
WRR Workers' remittances, receipts (BoP, current US$) 371 884000000 2.69E+09 0 19700000000 
INF_Mor Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 371 69.73 25.57 12 130 
FPR Fiscal policy rating (1=low to 6=high) 371 3.40 0.68 1.5 4.5 
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3.2 Empirical strategy 
Considering the panel data, we would like to take into account how financial crisis within an OECD-
EU donor country may have an effect on country’s ODA disbursements to the LDCs over time. We 
would also like to investigate how ODA flow shocks affect the LDCs’ economic development process.  
To estimate the corresponding model, we employ two types of estimation techniques; static panel 
estimation and dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimation.  
 
3.2.1 Static panel estimation 
We start with Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimation for our models. According to 
econometric assumption, the OLS estimators are consistent when all explanatory variables are not 
correlated with the error term. However, there is a possibility to violate this assumption if 
explanatory variables are correlated with the error term and/or unobserved country specific effects 
i.e. endogeneity problem.  
Consider traditional cross-country regressions, our empirical models are as follows:  
                '
, , ,
ln [ ]
i t i t i i t
NDODA X
                                    
                                                  (1)  
        '
, , ,
[Z]
i t i t i i t
RGDPCG
         
                                                                                    (2) 
Where, Eq. (1) and (2) represent 17 OECD-EU donor countries and 53 LDCs respectively. In Eq. 1, 
lnNDODA is the logarithm of Net ODA disbursed by each donor considered as dependent variable 
and X represents the set of explanatory variables (donor countries public debt, output gap, general 
government fiscal balance, log of population, log of trade openness, log of real effective exchange 
rate, log of inflation rate, log of unemployment rate and banking crisis dummy).  
,i t
 is an 
independently distributed  error term with     ,   0  and the subscripts i  and t  denotes country 
and time period respectively.   
i
 is an unobserved country specific effects which are not correlated 
with  
,i t
  .  
In Eq. (2), RGDPCG is the ODA recipient countries’ GDP per capita growth treated as a dependent 
variable in this model. Where Z consists the set of explanatory variables (ODA total net disbursement 
[18] 
 
from each countries, net foreign direct investment inflow, debt forgiveness or reduction, total 
external debt stocks, worker’s remittance, GINI index, export growth, corruption index, total 
population, net bilateral financial flow, net multilateral financial flow, fiscal policy index, 
macroeconomic management index, exchange rates, infant mortality rate and affected by natural 
disaster).  
i
 and ,i t represents country specific effects and error terms respectively.  
 
When we execute pooled OLS (POLS) regression, we do not consider unobserved country specific 
effects for our models, Eq. (1) and (2). Thus, heterogeneity of the countries can appear of the 
estimated parameters. As a result, we estimate the models incorporate unobserved country specific 
effects by Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) techniques.  However, incorporating the country 
specific effects has several benefits, e.g. it allows accounting for specific effects.  Later we use 
Breusch and Pagan’s LM test to test the relevancy of unobservable country specific effects. This test 
helps us to decide between RE and POLS. If we reject the null hypothesis13  POLS is not the 
appropriate technique for estimation and vice versa. Additionally, we also use the Hausman test14 to 
examine the correlation between regressors and unobserved country specific effects. The Hausman 
test allows us to test for the misspecification between FE and RE estimation. Furthermore we 
estimate FE and RE with AR (1) disturbance. To test for AR (1) disturbance we perform Baltagi-Wu 
locally best invariant test. Since, several literature suspects the possibility of endogeneity of foreign 
aid in the growth regressions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Boone, 1994, 1996; C.  Burnside & Dollar, 
2000; C. Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Hadjimichael, Ghur, Muhleisen, Nord, & Ucer, 1995; Hansen & 
Tarp, 2001), we consider the endogeneity of ODA and employ Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
                                                          
13 H0 : Irrelevance of unobserved country specific effects and HA : Relevance of unobserved country specific 
effects. 
14 H0 : No correlation exists between regressors and unobserved country specific effects and HA : Correlation 
exists between regressors and unobserved country specific effects 
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technique for FE, RE and Baltagis’s Error Components 2SLS (EC2SLS15) RE estimator. Lastly, we use 
the Hausman test to compare these estimators’ results.  
 
3.2.2 GMM estimators for dynamic panel models 
Since, the static linear panel model does not permit us to analyze the possible dynamism, we use the 
dynamic panel estimators that were pioneered by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond, Hoeffler, Temple, 
and Research (2001). Our two panels consist of data from 7016 countries over the time period 2004-
2010. Since we use yearly data, our panel permits seven observations for each country. In dynamic 
framework, Eq. (1) and (2) can be written in following specifications; 
    

    '
, 1 , 1 , ,
ln ln [ ]
i t i t i t i i t
NDODA NDODA X
                                                        (3) 
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For       
, ,
1,........   and  2,.... ,  where ( ) and ( )
i i t i i t
i N t T have the standard error 
component structure; 
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is for Eq. (4). 
 
Now, we take the first difference to eliminate country specific effects of Eq. (3) and (4),  
  
 
   

     
 
'
, , 1 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1
, , 1
ln ln (ln ln ) [ ]
( )
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
NDODA NDODA NDODA NDODA X X
      (5)                                                   
                                                          
15 Baltagi (1984) shows Monte Carlo experiments on a two-Eq. simultaneous model with error components 
and demonstrates the efficiency gains in terms of mean squared error in performing EC2SLS (see Baltagi 
2005). 
16 First panel data set consists of 17 DAC-OECD countries and second panel of 53 least developing countries 
(LDCs). 
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In the fact that for both Eq. (5) and (6), the lagged dependent variable 
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which implies that the regressors are likely endogenous. Thus, we need to use instruments to deal 
with Eq. (5) and (6).  According to econometric assumptions, the error term is not serially correlated 
and the regressors are weakly exogenous17. Therefore, the dynamic panel GMM estimator employs 
the following moment conditions based on difference estimator for Eq. (3); 
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Similarly for Eq. (4) is; 
 
 
 
   
, , , 1
[ ( )] 0         for   3,...... ,      2
i t s i t i t
E RGDPCG t T s      (9) 
 
 
   
, , , 1
[ ( )] 0         for   3,...... ,      2
i t s i t i t
E Z t T s                   (10) 
 
 
Which can be written in following matrix form as;  
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17 Assuming that the regressors are not correlated with future error terms.  
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Here, M  is the instruments matrix corresponding to the endogenous variables, where 
,i t s
y  refers to 
,
ln
i t s
NDODA  for Eq. (7) and 
,i t s
RGDPCG  for Eq. (9). 
 
However, the first differenced estimator is criticized in terms of bias and imprecision.  Thus, to 
reduce potential biases and imprecision,  Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that, when regressors 
have short time period, we can use a new estimator that combines a system in the difference 
estimator with the estimator in levels, which is called the Blundell and Bond system GMM.  The 
difference operator in Eq. uses the same instrument as above and the instruments for the levels are 
the lagged difference of the regressors. The econometric assumption here is that the difference in the 
regressors and the country specific effect are uncorrelated.  Therefore the stationary properties are: 
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The additional moment conditions for the levels are; 
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Now we can use GMM technique for both models to estimate consistent and efficient parameter by 
employing the moment conditions given in Eq. (7), (8), (11) and (12) for the OECD-EU donor 
countries model and those in Eq. (9), (10), (13) and (14) for LDCs model. 
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Finally, to  check the validity of the instruments in the system-GMM estimator, we implement two 
specification test, which is suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). First, the Sargan test of over-identification to check the validity of the 
instruments and second the Arellano-Bond test to check the hypothesis that error term is serially 
uncorrelated.    
 
4 Estimation results and discussion 
This section presents the estimation results of our research, which aims to answer our two prime 
objectives: firstly, whether the exogenous component of the global financial crisis affects OECD-EU 
donor countries ODA disbursements to the LDCs and secondly, how it impacts on LDCs economic 
prosperity. We estimate Eq. (1) and (2) on the data set described above by using static panel 
methods and Eq. (3) and (4) by using dynamic panel GMM estimation. We also run various 
econometric tests to check the validity of our models plus the hypothesis of interest, and 
subsequently discuss the robustness checks of our obtained estimation results.    
 
4.1 Static panel estimation results 
 
To analyze of our hypotheses, first we employ static panel estimation techniques in Eq. (1) and (2). 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 depict the estimation results of OECD-EU donor countries (Eq. 1) and LDCs (Eq. 2) 
respectively. In both tables columns 1 to 8 shows different estimation results Column 1 contains 
pooled OLS (POLS) results. As we cannot consider unobserved country specific effects in POLS we 
therefore execute within group-fixed effect (FE) and generalized least square (GLS)-random effect 
(RE) estimation, presented in columns 2 and 3 respectively. Columns 4 and 5 demonstrate the FE 
and RE result considering AR (1) disturbance. Since we have considered the possible endogeneity 
problem in our models, thus for Eq. (1), we suspect general government fiscal balance is endogenous 
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and use public debt, log of unemployment rate, log of inflation and banking crisis dummy as  
instruments for that. For the Eq. (2), we consider the endogeneity of ODA and used FDI inflows, 
export growth rate, debt forgiveness or reduction, GINI index, population, exchange rate and 
workers’ remittances as instruments for it. In both tables (4.1 and 4.2), column 6 and 7 contains 
2SLS-FE and 2SLS-RE estimation results. Finally, column 8 show Baltagi’s error components 2SLS-RE 
estimation results to check the robustness of our models.  
In table 4.1, the empirical model is related with a log of net ODA disbursements to a set of 
explanatory variables. All variables are in log except public debt (DPD), output gap (DOG), 
government fiscal balance (DGGFB) and banking crisis dummy (bc-dummy). The explanatory 
variables (all columns) consist of the probability of global financial crisis induced macroeconomic 
indicators on ODA disbursements from OECD-EU donor countries. Pooled OLS results show that 
public debt (DPD), output gap (DOG), population (Lpop), GDP per capita (Lgdpc), trade openness 
(Ltop) and real exchange rate (Lrer) all have a significant effect on ODA flows with estimated 
elasticity of -0.0115, -0.035, 1.30, 0.955, 1.23, and 0.363 respectively.  The positive coefficient refers 
that variables have positive effects on ODA disbursements and vice versa.  
Since the POLS estimation does not control for the country specific effects, we carried out FE and RE. 
Our RE estimation results (column 3) reported the similar results as POLS. Additionally, to check the 
relevance of country specific effects, the LM test indicates that we reject null hypothesis, implying 
POLS is not the appropriate technique to show the relationship between ODA flows and its 
determinants. In column 2, FE estimation shows most of the variables coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, except public debt (-0.014) and population (7.056). However, the Hausman test does 
not reject the null hypothesis with p-value 0.9053, so RE appears to be appropriate for this model.  
Furthermore, column 4 reports FE estimation with AR (1) disturbance. The result implies that public 
debt has statistically negative significant effect on ODA flows, meaning that ODA donors tend to give 
less ODA to the LDCs in the period of financial crisis. Although the results of the other variables are 
remains statistically insignificant, although the coefficients represent a major effect on the donors’ 
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ODA disbursements.  RE estimation with AR(1) reported in column 5 shows that there is a very 
strong significant relationship between ODA disbursements and its determinants. This means that 
public, debt output gap, general government fiscal balance and banking crisis dummy have a 
significant negative influence on ODA disbursements, whereas population, GDP per capita, trade 
openness and real exchange rate shows a significant positive relationship as estimated in POLS. To 
test for AR (1) disturbance for both FE and RE, we perform Baltagi-Wu locally best invariant (LBI) 
test. The value of Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic far below 2 implies that correction for serial correlation is 
needed (Baltagi, 1984, 2005; Kögel, 2004). For our model Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic value (2.1977) 
indicates that correction for serial correlation is not necessary.  
To further check the robustness of the relationship, column 6 and 7 estimates the regression 
considering 2SLS for both FE and RE. We suspect general government fiscal balance (DGGFB) are 
endogenous and chose public debt (DPD), log of unemployment rate (Lue), log of inflation (Linf) and 
banking crisis dummy as  instruments for this. Our results indicate that general government fiscal 
balance has a negative effect on ODA disbursements by -0.02 in FE and -0.04 in RE. However, the 
Hausman test result (0.359), which accepts the null hypothesis, suggests to us 2SLS-RE is 
appropriate estimator than 2SLS-FE.  Another way of dealing with the endogeneity problem, in 
column 8 we estimate EC2SLS-RE. The EC2SLS-RE coefficient values are similar to those reported by 
2SLS-RE, which implies DPD and DGGFB have significant negative effect, whereas population (Lpop) 
and trade openness (Ltop) have significant positive effect on OECD-EU donor countries ODA flows. 
To test for the misspecification between the 2SLS-FE and EC2SLS-RE, we again conduct a Hausman 
test. Since under the Hausman test our p-value is 0.4415, we accept the null hypothesis, which allows 
us to reject 2SLS-FE in favor of the EC2SLS-RE model. 
To compare all estimators for Eq. (1), we found RE is appropriate for our model. The results show 
that OECD-EU donors’ output gap, public debt and general government fiscal balance have significant 
negative impact on their ODA disbursement to the LDCs after the global financial crisis in all 
specifications. The results also revealed that population, GDP per capita, trade openness and real 
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exchange rate have significant positive effects, which imply that the LDCs are more favorable in 
terms of donors GDP per capita and trade openness. Notably, the banking crisis dummy showed a 
statistically insignificant coefficient, which has a large negative effect (all most -0.09 in every 
specifications) in our model. 
Table 4.2 shows the results for the different estimator of Eq. (2), where the dependent variable is 
GDP per capita growth rate (RGDPCG). Table 4.2 is presented in a similar manner to Table 4.1; 
columns 1-3 show POLS, FE and RE estimation results respectively. Our POLS estimation results 
suggest that net bilateral financial flows (NFF_Bi), net multilateral financial flows (NFF_Mu), 
Workers remittances and ODA flows have statistically significant strong negative impact on per 
capita growth rate of LDCs with estimated elasticity of -3.41e-09, -5.40e-09 and -1.63e-09 US$, 
whereas ODA changes by -0.003 percent.  Additionally, other explanatory variables (e.g. 
macroeconomic management rating (MMR), fiscal policy rating (Fpr), affected by natural disaster 
(AND)) have significant effect on growth rate as well. In testing the relevancy of the country specific 
effect, the LM test   rejects the null hypothesis with 1 percent significance level, implying this country 
specific effect needs to be considered. The FE estimation coefficient shows that debt forgiveness or 
reduction (DFoR), NFF_Bi, NFF_Mu, ODA and Wrr have strong negative effect on growth rate, on the 
other hand total external debt stocks (TEDS), corruption index (CI) and affected by natural disaster 
(AND) have significantly positive impact on growth. To test for the misspecification between the FE 
and RE, the Hausman test suggests accepting the null hypothesis in favor of RE estimation. 
Furthermore, to check the serial correlation, we conduct FE and RE estimation considering AR (1) 
disturbance, shown in columns 4 and 5. Column 5 shows almost the same coefficient value as we get 
in RE (column 3). However, the Baltagi-Wu LBI statistic value (2.2512) for both FE-AR(1) and RE-
AR(1)  estimation indicates that correction for serial correlation is not necessary.  
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Table 4.1: Static panel estimation results of OECD-EU donor countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation method POLS FE RE FE AR(1) RE AR(1) 2SLS-FE 2SLS-RE EC2SLS-RE 
         
DPD -0.0115** -0.0138* -0.0115** -0.0129* -0.0100* - - - 
 (0.00562) (0.00711) (0.00562) (0.00763) (0.00560) - - - 
DOG -0.0350* -0.0249 -0.0350* -0.000960 -0.0373* -0.0208 -0.0400** -0.0360** 
 (0.0186) (0.0226) (0.0186) (0.0229) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0165) (0.0159) 
DGGFB -0.00533 -0.00520 -0.00533 0.000389 -0.00566 -0.0201** -0.0172*** -0.0149*** 
 (0.00412) (0.00551) (0.00412) (0.00562) (0.00393) (0.00793) (0.00509) (0.00437) 
Lpop 1.300*** 7.056* 1.300*** 0.704 1.343*** 7.475** 1.510*** 1.429*** 
 (0.202) (4.022) (0.202) (0.613) (0.172) (3.682) (0.222) (0.213) 
Lgdpc 0.955** 0.603 0.955** 0.0885 0.872** 0.131 0.275 0.360 
 (0.397) (0.685) (0.397) (0.574) (0.405) (0.612) (0.376) (0.353) 
Lue 0.236 0.191 0.236 0.359 0.133 - - - 
 (0.256) (0.318) (0.256) (0.344) (0.266) - - - 
Ltop 1.230** 0.417 1.230** 0.184 1.419*** 0.417 1.728*** 1.582*** 
 (0.542) (0.953) (0.542) (0.894) (0.483) (0.878) (0.541) (0.527) 
Lrer 0.363* 0.0460 0.363* -0.744 0.385** 0.218 0.229 0.262 
 (0.211) (0.924) (0.211) (0.609) (0.174) (0.922) (0.229) (0.221) 
Linf -0.0372 -3.62e-05 -0.0372 -0.00277 -0.0541 - - - 
 (0.0621) (0.0718) (0.0621) (0.0707) (0.0634) - - - 
Bcdummy -0.0886 -0.0968 -0.0886 -0.0653 -0.0922 - - - 
 (0.108) (0.113) (0.108) (0.0982) (0.108) - - - 
         
R2 0.7858 0.3317 0.7858 0.1748 0.7937 0.3433 0.7507 0.7618 
LM test - - 133.25*** - - - - - 
Baltagi-Wu LBI test - - - 2.1977 2.1977 - - - 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.9053 - 0.3590 0.4415 
Observations 111 111 111 94 111 111 111 111 
Donor countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Note: dependent variable is log of net ODA (LNDODA). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) POLS, Pooled OLS estimation; (2) 
FE, Within group fixed effect estimation; (3) RE, GLS random effect estimation, (4) FE AR(1), Within group fixed effect estimation with AR(1) disturbance; (5)  RE 
AR(1),  GLS random effect estimation with AR(1) disturbance; (6)  2SLS-FE, Two-step least square fixed effect estimation;  (7) 2SLS-RE, Two-step least square 
random effect estimation; (8) EC2SLS-RE, Baltagi error component  2SLS-RE.  
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As several literature (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Boone, 1994, 1996; C.  Burnside & Dollar, 2000; C. 
Burnside & Dollar, 2004; Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Hansen & Tarp, 2001) suspect the possibility of 
endogeneity of foreign aid in the growth regressions we consider the endogeneity of ODA and 
employ the2SLS technique for FE, RE and EC2SLS, displayed in columns 6-8. We chose debt 
forgiveness or reduction (DFoR), population (Pop), net bilateral financial flows (NFF_Bi) and 
workers’ remittances (Wrr) as instruments for ODA.  In column 6; 2SLS-FE coefficients shows that 
OECD-EU donors’ ODA flows has significantly negative effect by -0.00237 percent on LDCs’ economic 
growth, which indicates that the global financial crisis leads to ODA fall and subsequently its negative 
effect on LDCs growth. Other variables have strong significant effects (e.g. NFF_Mu, AND, TEDS, MMR 
and infant mortality rate (INF_Mor)). Columns 7-8 contain relatively similar results and all deterrent 
variables are significant with slightly less elastic in absolute value than those reported by 2SLS-FE. 
However, the Hausman test with p-value 0.0002, between 2SLS-FE and 2SLS-RE suggest for rejecting 
null hypothesis in favor of 2SLS-FE.  Alternatively, Hausman test with p-value 0.0001 based on the 
contrast between 2SLS-FE and EC2SLS-RE reject the null hypothesis, which supports 2SLS-FE 
estimation as well.  
Taking together the results in Table 4.2, the LDCs’ per capita economic growth is affected by the 
negative impact of ODA flows with an estimated elasticity of about -0.003 percent from OECD-EU 
donors in our all specifications. Additionally, net bilateral financial flows, net multilateral financial 
flows (EU-institutions), debt forgiveness or reduction and workers’ remittances also have similar 
significant negative impact on the LDCs economic growth. This means that, due to the global financial 
crisis, the economic progress by LDCs is highly affected through the above transmission channels.  
The results also discovered that LDCs’ export growth rate is negatively affects by all most -0.007 
percent in all given specifications to the per capita GDP growth, in which implies that LDCs’ export 
growth rate is substantially reduced although this result is not statistically significant.  
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4.2 Dynamic panel GMM estimation results 
Since our static linear panel model from both donor and recipient countries’ point of view does not 
permit us to analyze the possible dynamism, we employ the dynamic panel GMM estimators in this 
regard.  
4.2.1 Results of OECD-EU donor countries 
The dynamic panel GMM estimation result shows the impact of global financial crisis on ODA 
disbursements. Table 4.3 and 4.4 presents the results using Arellano and Bond (1991) difference and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimators respectively. Our analysis considered LNDODA as 
a dependent variable with a lagged dependent variable and set of other explanatory variables (Eq. 
3). We also present Sargan test18 and Arellano-Bond serial correlation test19 in Table 4.3 and 4.4. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimation results, considering all lags, are presented in 
columns 2 of Table 4.3. The results suggest that the exogenous component of the global financial 
crisis exerts a large negative impact on OECD-DAC EU ODA flows although most of the coefficients 
are not statistically significant. In column 3, we considered all lags with year dummy to control for 
any shocks that are common for all countries. Comparing the column 2 and 3 coefficients, the results 
are not significantly different. Thus, we use 2SLS estimator considering all lags (column 4) and 
coefficients are now showing more statistically significant results. Although the Sargan test supports 
the validity of our estimation, the Arellano-Bond AR (2) test rejects the null hypothesis and implies 
that there is second order serial correlation, which is not desirable. Next, we consider all lags with 
year dummy (column 5) and employed 2SLS.  The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables is 
showing large negative effects (-0.914) including other variables. The negative lagged value of the 
dependent variable suggests that there is no dynamic effect.  Furthermore, to get more consistent 
results we estimate AB-GMM considering maximum one lag (column 6) and maximum one lag with 
year dummy (column 7). The coefficients values are almost identical and statistically insignificant. 
                                                          
18 H0: Instrumental variables are not correlated with error terms. 
he terms kjk(
,i t
 ) are iid with variance (σ2) for respective first difference. Thus, we have to use the 
appropriate test whether the 
,i t
   in first differences are AR(2) or not (Lachenmaier and Rottmann, 2011).  
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Table 4.2: Static panel estimation results for LDCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation method POLS FE RE FE -AR(1) RE -AR(1) 2SLS-FE 2SLS-RE EC2SLS-RE 
FDInf 0.0384 0.0400 0.0384 0.0410 0.0383 0.0661 0.0388 0.0402 
 (0.0512) (0.0449) (0.0512) (0.0403) (0.0519) (0.0567) (0.0543) (0.0542) 
ExG -0.00614 -0.00690 -0.00614 -0.00780 -0.00576 -0.0102 -0.00610 -0.00617 
 (0.00721) (0.00553) (0.00721) (0.00473) (0.00730) (0.00699) (0.00807) (0.00806) 
DFoR -1.52e-10 -5.40e-10* -1.52e-10 0 -1.32e-10 - - - 
 (4.14e-10) (3.27e-10) (4.14e-10) (2.80e-10) (4.20e-10) - - - 
TEDS 4.64e-10*** 8.72e-10*** 4.64e-10*** -1.11e-10 4.33e-10*** 1.29e-09*** 3.14e-10*** 3.18e-10*** 
 (8.97e-11) (9.69e-11) (8.97e-11) (1.15e-10) (9.03e-11) (1.09e-10) (6.31e-11) (6.29e-11) 
CI 1.602** 2.267* 1.602** -0.0890 1.576** -0.236 1.409* 1.410* 
 (0.766) (1.213) (0.766) (1.122) (0.759) (1.502) (0.723) (0.722) 
GINI 0.00323 -0.150 0.00323 -0.0842 -0.000773 -0.162 -0.0510 -0.0485 
 (0.0619) (0.190) (0.0619) (0.180) (0.0606) (0.240) (0.0562) (0.0562) 
Pop 5.40e-08* 3.07e-07 5.40e-08* 5.84e-08 5.62e-08* - - - 
 (2.93e-08) (1.89e-07) (2.93e-08) (1.93e-07) (2.92e-08) - - - 
NFF_Bi -3.41e-09*** -2.13e-09** -3.41e-09*** -1.27e-10 -3.41e-09*** - - - 
 (1.14e-09) (1.01e-09) (1.14e-09) (8.59e-10) (1.17e-09) - - - 
NFF_Mu -5.40e-09*** -2.30e-09 -5.40e-09*** -2.26e-09* -5.56e-09*** -7.85e-09*** -8.17e-09*** -8.18e-09*** 
 (1.64e-09) (1.42e-09) (1.64e-09) (1.32e-09) (1.67e-09) (1.67e-09) (1.69e-09) (1.69e-09) 
MMR -1.446* -1.211 -1.446* -0.258 -1.481* 1.790* -1.050 -1.045 
 (0.836) (0.860) (0.836) (0.809) (0.843) (1.049) (0.847) (0.846) 
AND 0.378** 0.276** 0.378** 0.220* 0.382** 0.810*** 0.490*** 0.499*** 
 (0.155) (0.133) (0.155) (0.126) (0.156) (0.159) (0.157) (0.157) 
Oda -0.00302*** -0.00355*** -0.00302*** -0.000182 -0.00299*** -0.00237*** -0.00122* -0.00154** 
 (0.000868) (0.000772) (0.000868) (0.000723) (0.000882) (0.000624) (0.000696) (0.000652) 
XR -3.15e-05 -0.000209 -3.15e-05 -8.78e-05 -1.95e-05 -0.000192 -3.00e-05 -3.35e-05 
 (0.000134) (0.000339) (0.000134) (0.000340) (0.000132) (0.000427) (0.000123) (0.000123) 
Wrr -1.63e-09*** -3.52e-09*** -1.63e-09*** 4.13e-10 -1.57e-09*** - - - 
 (2.41e-10) (3.15e-10) (2.41e-10) (4.82e-10) (2.42e-10) - - - 
INF_Mor 0.0183 0.0151 0.0183 0.137** 0.0183 0.176*** 0.0198 0.0215 
 (0.0188) (0.0617) (0.0188) (0.0660) (0.0185) (0.0650) (0.0173) (0.0172) 
Fpr 2.452*** 1.252 2.452*** 0.713 2.526*** -0.787 1.928** 1.976** 
 (0.875) (0.991) (0.875) (0.903) (0.878) (1.233) (0.859) (0.857) 
R2 0.897 0.0526 0.897 0.0030 0.0939 0.0346 0.0953 0.0932 
LM test - - 56.48*** - - - - - 
Baltagi-Wu test - - - 2.2512 2.2512 - - - 
Hausman test - 0.9262 - - 0.0002 0.0001 
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Table 4.2: (continued)     
Observations 371 371 371 318 371 371 371 371 
No. of LDCs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth rate (RGPCG). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
    Table 4.3: Dynamic panel estimation results for OECD-EU donor counties (Arellano and Bond 1991 difference GMM approach)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Estimation method POLS AB-GMM AB-GMM AB-GMM(2S) AB-GMM(2S) AB-GMM(1L) AB-GMM(1L) AB-GMM(1L,2S) AB-GMM(1L,2S) 
L.LNDODA 0.651*** -0.260 -0.205 -0.332** -0.914* 0.00222 -0.123 -0.182 -0.797* 
 (0.0677) (0.202) (0.196) (0.148) (0.508) (0.369) (0.234) (0.180) (0.442) 
DPD -0.00290 -0.0196** -0.0224* -0.0168*** 0.0732 -0.0181* -0.0175 -0.0143*** 0.0464* 
 (0.00283) (0.00926) (0.0118) (0.00454) (0.0514) (0.0102) (0.0125) (0.00359) (0.0243) 
DOG -0.00158 -0.0146 -0.00154 -0.0406*** -0.118* -0.0179 0.00255 -0.00769 -0.101*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0282) (0.0432) (0.0154) (0.0681) (0.0311) (0.0451) (0.0166) (0.0377) 
DGGFB -0.00199 -0.00313 -0.00154 -0.00309 -0.0167 -0.00384 -0.00276 -0.00132 -0.0195 
 (0.00186) (0.00700) (0.00744) (0.00319) (0.0184) (0.00786) (0.00778) (0.00206) (0.0163) 
Lpop 0.515*** 7.388 9.586 9.560 -46.99 4.592 10.27 4.361** -40.20 
 (0.116) (5.951) (6.448) (10.68) (79.26) (7.084) (6.701) (1.951) (58.34) 
Lgdpc 0.457* 0.463 3.114* -0.0527 21.92** 0.819 3.541* 1.057*** 17.95*** 
 (0.242) (0.805) (1.785) (1.400) (9.417) (0.901) (1.905) (0.331) (6.807) 
Lue 0.108 0.521 0.611 0.111 1.590 0.606 0.619 0.652*** 1.679 
 (0.155) (0.438) (0.460) (0.378) (1.751) (0.502) (0.484) (0.203) (1.618) 
Ltop 0.612*** 0.956 2.664 2.175* 5.309 0.641 3.112* 0.281 8.622** 
 (0.229) (1.090) (1.814) (1.250) (5.793) (1.195) (1.861) (0.811) (3.377) 
Lrer 0.150** -0.128 0.210 -0.569 -6.051 0.106 0.225 -0.397 -2.374 
 (0.0686) (0.978) (1.221) (0.880) (9.690) (1.057) (1.242) (0.378) (5.005) 
Linf -0.0104 -0.0762 -0.0207 -0.0807*** -0.000376 -0.0744 -0.0333 -0.00729 0.00632 
 (0.0729) (0.0796) (0.0994) (0.0265) (0.0807) (0.0860) (0.102) (0.0382) (0.0636) 
Bcdummy -0.255** -0.0427 -0.00254 -0.0416 -0.338 -0.113 -0.0121 -0.0862 -0.0653 
 (0.107) (0.120) (0.157) (0.0564) (0.575) (0.143) (0.166) (0.0993) (0.197) 
Year dummy   yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sargan test(p-value) - 0.1819 0.0759 0.8405 - 0.2397 0.0319 0.1710 - 
A-B test  AR(1) - - - 0.1229 0.1273 - - 0.1584 0.1182 
A-B test  AR(2) - - - 0.0111 0.6363 - - 0.1195 0.8397 
Observations 94 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Donor countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Note: Dependent variable is log of net ODA (LNDODA). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1)Pooled OLS(2) AB-GMM, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM with all lags; (3)AB-GMM, AB considering all lags with year dummy; (4)AB-GMM(2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering all lags; (5)AB-
GMM(2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering all lags with year dummy; (6)AB-GMM(1L),  AB-GMM considering max. 1 lag; (7) AB-GMM (1L),  AB-GMM considering max. 
1 lag with year dummy; (8) AB-GMM(1L,2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering max. 1 lag; (9) AB-GMM (1L,2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering max. 1 lag with year dummy.
[31] 
 
 Thus, we estimate again our model using 2SLS considering maximum one lag (column 8) and 
maximum one lag with year dummy (column 9). The Sargan test is not rejected, so the null 
hypothesis implies the validity of our estimations and subsequently the A-B AR (2) test supports 
that there is no serial correlation. However, the results of the coefficients (column 8 and 9) are still 
not convincing and showing the less significant effect. The Sargan test in column 8 is not 
determined as we get statistically unexpected (1.000) result, thus we estimate our model 
considering Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator for our further investigation. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results of system GMM considering all lags, all lags with year dummy, 2-3 lags 
and 2-3 lags with year dummy in column 1, 2 , 3 and 4 respectively. Except column 1, the Sargan test 
statistics supports the validity of our estimations. Since the Sargan test does not reject the null 
hypothesis, the instruments we used are valid. The A-B AR (2) test also suggests accepting the null 
hypothesis, proposing there is no second order serial correlation of our estimations. The 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable validate the importance of including these variables. 
However, the first 3 specifications (column 1-3) are showing quite similar effects. In column 1, we 
found a significant effect of the lag dependent variable (0.585), but all our explanatory variables e.g. 
DPD, DOG, Lpop, Lue, Ltop and Bcdummy indicate statistically insignificant results with an 
estimated elasticity of -0.006, -0.05, -0.14, -0.57, -0.71 and -0.85 percent respectively. Besides, the 
Sargan test reject the null hypothesis i.e. the instruments are not valid. Therefore, we carried out 
further estimation considering all lags with year dummy (column 2). Since our results are quite 
similar with column 1, we need to consider the further estimation.  We therefore use 2SLS 
estimation considering 2-3 lags with year dummy. In column 4, the test statistics supports both 
validations of our instruments and there is no second order serial correlation of our model. The 
coefficient of the lag dependent variable shows the lager importance with an estimated elasticity of 
3.60. The positive lagged value of the dependent variable suggests the existence of significant 
dynamic effects in on the financial crisis and ODA disbursements to the LDCs.   
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Table 4.4: panel estimation results for OECD-EU donor counties (Blundell and Bond 1998 system 
GMM approach) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method System GMM System GMM System GMM (2-3L) System GMM (2-3L) 
L.LNDODA 0.585** 0.270 0.339 3.600** 
 (0.270) (2.064) (0.227) (1.727) 
DPD -0.00617 0.290* -0.0151 0.209* 
 (0.00807) (0.172) (0.0150) (0.118) 
DOG -0.0538 -1.116 -0.0391 -0.518 
 (0.0578) (1.132) (0.0298) (0.468) 
DGGFB 0.0225 -0.0866 0.0261 -0.162** 
 (0.0328) (0.128) (0.0180) (0.0788) 
Lpop -0.141 1.787 0.174 -1.235 
 (1.224) (4.198) (0.373) (1.818) 
Lgdpc 2.372 30.34 2.762* -0.114 
 (2.502) (29.41) (1.464) (4.251) 
Lue -0.560 -0.389 0.119 -3.418 
 (1.405) (1.717) (0.752) (4.967) 
Ltop -0.715 8.173 -0.518 6.782* 
 (2.769) (12.55) (0.906) (3.549) 
Lrer 1.006 -12.51 1.730 -16.50* 
 (0.730) (12.95) (1.162) (9.124) 
Linf 0.0678 -2.837 -0.0423 1.332 
 (0.176) (1.828) (0.118) (4.658) 
Bcdummy -0.854 -1.886 -0.689** -5.276** 
 (0.975) (3.560) (0.296) (2.191) 
Year dummy  yes  Yes 
Sargan test(p-value) 0.046 0.121 0.115 0.942 
A-B test  AR(1) 0.016 0.214 0.012 0.280 
A-B test  AR(2) 0.406 0.913 0.715 0.712 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Donor countries 17 17 17 17 
Note: Dependent variable is log of net ODA (LNODA). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) System GMM, Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering all lags; (2) System 
GMM, Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering all lags with year dummy; (3) System GMM (2-3L), 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering max 2-3 lags; (4) System GMM (2-3L), Blundell and Bond 
(1998) system GMM considering max. 2-3 lags with year dummy; 
 
This result also explores that general government fiscal balance (DGGFB), real exchange rate (Lrer) 
and banking crisis dummy shows significant negative effect on ODA flows. Subsequently, output gap 
(DOG), and unemployment rate (Lue) also depict considerably negative effects although its not 
statistically significant.  
 
In short, the finding of the OECD-DAC EU donor countries dynamic panel analysis (Eq. 3) revealed 
that global financial crisis affects ODA flows to the LDCs. This is also supported by our static panel 
data analysis (Eq. 1). Our estimation results indicate that OECD-DAC EU donors tended to provide 
less amounts of ODA to the LDCs in the period of financial turmoil.  
[33] 
 
 
4.2.2 Results of least developed countries 
Table 4.5 is presented in a similar specification to Table 4.1; columns 1-9 show (1) PolS (2) AB-GMM 
estimator considering all lags, (3) AB-GMM estimator considering all lags with year dummy, (4) AB-
GMM 2SLS estimator considering all lags, (5) AB-GMM 2SLS estimator considering all lags with year 
dummy, (6) AB-GMM estimator considering maximum one lag, (7) AB-GMM estimator considering 
maximum one lag with year dummy, (8) AB-GMM 2SLS estimator considering maximum one lags 
and (9) AB-GMM 2SLS estimator considering maximum  one lag with year dummy respectively.  
Columns 2 and 3, the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis and does not support the validity of our 
instruments. Therefore, we estimate 2SLS considering all lags (column 4) and all lags with year 
dummy (column 4). Our results explain in columns 4-5, the test statistics support the validity of our 
estimations.  Since, Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis i.e. instruments are statistically 
validate. The A-B AR (2) test also does not reject the null hypothesis in second order serial 
correlation, meaning that in second order our model is no serial correlation. The coefficients values 
are almost identical with other specifications and statistically insignificant. Thus, we estimate again 
our model using 2SLS considering maximum one lag (column 8) and maximum one lag with year 
dummy (column 9). The Sargan test is not rejected, so the null hypothesis implies the validity of our 
estimations and subsequently the A-B AR (2) test supports that there is no serial correlation. 
However, the results of the coefficients of the explanatory variables e.g. exchange rate (ExR), debt 
forgiveness reduction (DFoR), net bilateral financial flows (NFF_Bi), worker remittances (wrr) and 
ODA  (column 8 and 9) are still not convincing and showing the insignificant effect. 
Furthermore, we employ Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator, presents in Table 4.6. 
The system GMM considering all lags repot in column 1 indicate that the lag of LDCs GDP per capita 
growth rate has a significant negative impact. The other explanatory variables e.g. NFF_Bi, NFF_Mu, 
ODA and Wrr also show negative impact but not statistically significant. The specification 1 satisfies 
A-B test, which implies that there is no evidence of second order serial correlation, but this 
[34] 
 
estimation do not pass the Sargan specification test, which means that the instruments are 
correlated with the residuals. Next, we estimate our model considering year dummies. The results 
(column 2) show that ODA has significant negative effects on LDCs economic growth. The rest of 
explanatory variables also show relatively similar impact to column 1. This estimation satisfies both 
Sargan and A-B specification test, which means the instruments are valid and not correlated with 
residuals as well as  the errors in the first difference estimation shows no AR(2) serial correlation.  
To further check the relationship, specifications 3 and 4 exhibit system GMM considering maximum 
2-3 lags and maximum 2-3 lags with year dummies respectively. Specification 3, all explanatory 
variables show insignificant but expected effects except lagged dependent variable, total external 
debt stocks (TEDS) and infant mortality (INF-Mor). Here, this estimation also satisfies the Sargan 
test but the A-B AR (1) test accept null hypothesis, which is not expected. Next we estimate 
considering year dummies, now the result (in column 4) supports both specification tests i.e. 
instruments are valid and there is no second order serial correlation. The coefficients of ODA and 
lagged dependent variable show the negative significant effects. The rest of explanatory variables 
portrait the remarkable effects as well and confirm the magnitude of including these variables, 
although these are not statistically significant.  
In summary, the finding of the LDCs dynamic panel analysis (Eq. 4) explored that ODA flows shock 
impact negatively to the LDCs economic progress. This logic also supported by our static panel data 
analysis (Eq. 2). Our estimation results indicate that the LDCs economic growth is largely affected 
through various transmission channels e.g. ODA, net bilateral and multilateral financial flows, 
export growth rate, exchange rate, FDI inflows and worker remittances.   
 
We therefore conclude that the dynamic system GMM panel estimation considering maximum 2-3 
lags is an appropriate estimator and can be relied upon the statistical inference relating to our 
hypothesis of interest. Moreover, it shows the most resemblance coefficients of the considered 
explanatory variables as estimated in static panel model before.
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Table 4.5: Dynamic panel estimation results for LDCs (Arellano and Bond 1991 difference GMM approach)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Estimation method POLS AB-GMM AB-GMM AB-GMM(2S) AB-GMM(2S) AB-GMM(1L) AB-GMM(1L) AB-GMM(1L 2S) AB-GMM(1L 2S) 
L.RGPCG 0.0989*** -0.0663 -0.0597 -0.0426* -0.0361** -0.0423 -0.0380 -0.0803** -0.0414 
 (0.0336) (0.0479) (0.0465) (0.0251) (0.0163) (0.0519) (0.0501) (0.0357) (0.0268) 
FDInf 0.0301 0.0552 0.0263 0.0819*** 0.0629*** 0.0519 0.0272 0.0570** 0.0362 
 (0.0306) (0.0541) (0.0539) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0549) (0.0546) (0.0245) (0.0262) 
ExG -0.00457 -0.000354 -0.000814 0.000152 -0.000449 -0.00139 -0.00150 -0.00165 -0.00182 
 (0.00516) (0.00534) (0.00519) (0.000892) (0.000966) (0.00543) (0.00526) (0.00166) (0.00166) 
DFoR 3.87e-11 -1.81e-10 -1.89e-11 -2.40e-10** -9.91e-11 -6.80e-11 1.32e-10 -1.22e-10 1.19e-10 
 (2.89e-10) (3.27e-10) (3.54e-10) (1.05e-10) (1.11e-10) (3.36e-10) (3.63e-10) (1.29e-10) (1.73e-10) 
TEDS -1.21e-10** 1.22e-10 1.39e-10 8.88e-11 8.05e-11 8.79e-11 1.02e-10 2.53e-10* 1.35e-10 
 (4.85e-11) (1.69e-10) (1.70e-10) (9.17e-11) (5.87e-11) (1.86e-10) (1.87e-10) (1.42e-10) (1.16e-10) 
CI 0.558 0.554 0.246 0.822 0.919 0.150 -0.241 -0.112 1.054 
 (0.360) (1.674) (1.615) (0.771) (0.893) (1.709) (1.654) (1.317) (1.239) 
GINI -0.0937*** 0.0478 -0.0521 0.0832 -0.00449 0.122 0.00541 0.158** -0.00530 
 (0.0273) (0.257) (0.251) (0.0887) (0.0464) (0.260) (0.255) (0.0693) (0.0622) 
Pop 1.50e-08 6.55e-08 1.10e-07 6.78e-08 6.70e-08 1.30e-07 1.42e-07 1.25e-07 1.67e-07 
 (1.58e-08) (2.57e-07) (2.55e-07) (8.30e-08) (8.15e-08) (2.67e-07) (2.62e-07) (1.71e-07) (1.54e-07) 
NFF_Bi 1.10e-09 -9.92e-10 -6.93e-10 -5.35e-10 -4.99e-10 -6.86e-10 -4.79e-10 -2.72e-10 7.41e-11 
 (7.75e-10) (1.19e-09) (1.16e-09) (5.96e-10) (3.09e-10) (1.21e-09) (1.18e-09) (7.42e-10) (4.55e-10) 
NFF_Mu -9.41e-11 -2.56e-09 -1.79e-09 -2.25e-09*** -1.41e-09** -2.27e-09 -1.43e-09 -2.21e-09*** -1.31e-09 
 (1.12e-09) (1.75e-09) (1.72e-09) (7.26e-10) (5.92e-10) (1.82e-09) (1.78e-09) (8.12e-10) (1.07e-09) 
MMR -0.576 -1.163 -1.193 0.125 0.0579 -1.199 -1.305 -0.585 -1.263 
 (0.472) (1.157) (1.126) (0.667) (0.812) (1.175) (1.146) (1.097) (1.165) 
AND 0.197* 0.244 0.268* 0.0713 0.0760 0.265* 0.272* 0.294** 0.236* 
 (0.100) (0.157) (0.155) (0.0689) (0.0660) (0.160) (0.157) (0.149) (0.126) 
oda 0.000601 -0.000581 -7.10e-05 -0.000431 -0.000235 -0.000300 0.000169 -0.000147 0.000459 
 (0.000573) (0.000892) (0.000901) (0.000368) (0.000243) (0.000960) (0.000962) (0.000471) (0.000515) 
XR 1.46e-05 -0.000160 -6.91e-05 6.21e-05 2.33e-05 -0.000263 -0.000195 -2.47e-05 -0.000121 
 (5.99e-05) (0.000538) (0.000529) (0.000182) (0.000169) (0.000546) (0.000537) (0.000236) (0.000238) 
wrr -1.34e-10 -5.96e-10 -5.51e-10 -3.75e-10 -2.33e-10 -5.03e-10 -4.80e-10 -1.02e-09 -6.30e-10 
 (1.28e-10) (7.15e-10) (7.08e-10) (4.50e-10) (3.34e-10) (7.60e-10) (7.52e-10) (7.53e-10) (6.58e-10) 
INF_Mor -0.00418 0.0846 -0.122 0.0355 -0.0769 0.0738 -0.0694 0.0129 -0.0889 
 (0.00842) (0.0865) (0.141) (0.0420) (0.0667) (0.0897) (0.143) (0.0526) (0.0888) 
fpr 0.575 2.429* 2.560** 1.626** 1.637** 2.374* 2.553** 2.240** 3.050*** 
 (0.470) (1.275) (1.247) (0.738) (0.782) (1.295) (1.265) (1.063) (1.075) 
Year dummy   yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
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Table 4.5 
(continued) 
         
Sargan test(p-
value) 
- 0.000 0.052 0.2579 0.7007 0.0019 0.1729 0.0681 0.0059 
A-B test  AR(1) - - - 0.0079 0.0108 - - 0.0020 0.6364 
A-B test  AR(2) - - - 0.7261 0.5920 - - 0.9452 0.5052 
Observations 318 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 
No. of LDCs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth rate (RGPCG). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1)POLS, Pooled OLS(2) 
AB-GMM, Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM with all lags; (3)AB-GMM, AB considering all lags with year dummy; (4)AB-GMM(2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering all 
lags; (5)AB-GMM(2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering all lags with year dummy; (6)AB-GMM(1L),  AB-GMM considering max. 1 lag; (7) AB-GMM (1L),  AB-GMM 
considering max. 1 lag with year dummy; (8) AB-GMM(1L,2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering max. 1 lag; (9) AB-GMM (1L,2S),  AB-GMM 2SLS considering max. 1 lag 
with year dummy.
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Table 4.6 : Dynamic panel estimation results for LDCs (Blundell and Bond 1998 system GMM 
approach)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method System GMM System GMM System GMM (2-3L) System GMM (2-3L) 
     
L.RGPCG -0.292*** -0.190*** -0.332** -0.257** 
 (0.0751) (0.0495) (0.139) (0.109) 
FDInf 0.681* -0.214 1.213 -0.126 
 (0.384) (0.220) (0.766) (0.490) 
ExG -0.0303*** -0.0100 -0.0409 -0.00541 
 (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0267) (0.0191) 
DFoR -3.00e-10 -4.42e-10 -1.43e-10 -7.97e-10 
 (3.23e-10) (3.84e-10) (8.17e-10) (6.73e-10) 
TEDS 1.55e-09*** 9.65e-10*** 1.86e-09* 1.47e-09** 
 (4.45e-10) (3.26e-10) (1.05e-09) (7.32e-10) 
CI 11.87* 17.42*** 10.94 13.39 
 (6.219) (6.368) (13.69) (8.561) 
GINI 0.804 0.245 0.547 -0.421 
 (0.703) (0.836) (1.473) (1.243) 
Pop -2.97e-07** 8.11e-09 -4.47e-07 -1.05e-07 
 (1.43e-07) (1.52e-07) (4.44e-07) (2.95e-07) 
NFF_Bi -1.55e-09 -2.75e-09 -3.24e-09 -6.24e-09 
 (2.11e-09) (1.72e-09) (4.86e-09) (3.98e-09) 
NFF_Mu -1.16e-09 -8.39e-10 -7.65e-09 -6.17e-09 
 (2.64e-09) (1.65e-09) (1.38e-08) (8.65e-09) 
MMR 12.35 -6.900 26.89 -4.427 
 (7.772) (6.225) (22.82) (11.63) 
AND 0.549** 0.329 0.210 -0.0330 
 (0.251) (0.261) (0.766) (0.542) 
oda -0.00185 -0.00275** -0.00269 -0.00479* 
 (0.00152) (0.00109) (0.00343) (0.00271) 
XR -0.00183 -0.00203* 0.000461 -0.00138 
 (0.00136) (0.00117) (0.00371) (0.00246) 
wrr 8.21e-10 -1.19e-09 2.02e-09 -4.49e-10 
 (9.58e-10) (7.42e-10) (2.71e-09) (1.56e-09) 
INF_Mor 0.217** 0.202** 0.454* 0.324* 
 (0.0912) (0.0899) (0.253) (0.196) 
fpr -3.178 0.641 -6.390 6.365 
 (4.690) (5.833) (10.80) (8.454) 
Year dummy  yes  Yes 
Sargan test(p-value) 0.015 0.285 0.815 0.435 
A-B test  AR(1) 0.020 0.017 0.079 0.022 
A-B test  AR(2) 0.741 0.356 0.438 0.778 
Observations 318 318 318 318 
No. of LDCs 53 53 53 53 
Note:  Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth rate (RGPCG). Robust standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) System GMM, Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering all lags; 
(2) System GMM, Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering all lags with year dummy; (3) System 
GMM (2-3L), Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering max 2-3 lags; (4) System GMM (2-3L), 
Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM considering max. 2-3 lags with year dummy; 
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4.3 Robustness checks 
We examine the robustness and the sensitivity of our results using three alternative estimation 
strategies. For robustness check firstly, we estimate our model employing Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation20 (MLE), secondly, Mixed Effects-Maximum Likelihood Estimation21 (ME-ML) and finally, 
Generalized Estimating Equations22 (GEE) for both static and dynamic models. All robustness checks 
using different estimation techniques supports our original estimation results.  
Table 4.7 reports a set of robustness checks for OECD-DAC EU donor countries’ models (Eq. 1 and Eq. 
3). The first robustness check (column 1) presents the MLE results considering the same 
explanatory variables, which we used in our main specifications. Columns 2 and 4 contain second 
and third robustness checks using ME-ML estimation and GEE techniques also considering the same 
explanatory variables respectively. All specifications under static panel coefficients support with our 
original specifications presented in Table 4.1. The coefficients of the explanatory variables (columns 
1, 2 and 4) are showing the similar and significant effects on ODA disbursements to the LDCs. We 
also estimate dynamic panel of OECD-DAC EU donors’ (Eq. 3) using ME-ML (column 3) and GEE 
(column 5). The coefficients are showing similar effect as we obtained using dynamic panel 
specification in Table 4.3 and 4.4. In particular, the lagged dependent variable remains positive and 
significant effect as the specifications in Table 4.4. The other explanatory variables’ coefficients also 
have similar significant effects with a bit variation. Therefore, we conclude that the qualitative 
specifications are robust to alternative estimation techniques.  
                                                          
20 Maximum Likelihood Estimation is a method of choosing an asymptotically efficient estimator for the set of 
parameters, because it can easily illustrate in the setting of a discrete distribution (Green, 2003). 
 
21The Linear Mixed models are described as containing both fixed effects and random effects. As the fixed 
effects estimation is similar to the standard regression coefficients and is estimated directly, whereas the 
random effects estimation is not directly estimated but is summarized according to their estimated variances 
and covariances (Stata, 2011). Therefore, the Mixed effects model  refers to the effect of the size parameters as 
if it was a random sample from a  population of effect parameters and estimates the hyper-parameters 
(generally the mean and variance) treating this population of effect parameters (see Schmidt and Hunter, 
1977, DerSimonian and Laird, 1986, Hedges and Vevea, 1998, Konstantopoulos, 2006). 
 
22 The Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) suggested by Liang and Zeger (1986), to extend the generalized 
linear model to allow for correlated observations. The GEE characterized the marginal expectation (average 
response for observations sharing the same covariates) as a function of covariates (Horton, 2001). 
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We carried out a set of robustness checks for LDCs (Eq. 2 and 4) as well. Table 4.8 presents similar 
robustness checks specification as we used in Table 4.7. Columns 1-5 shows MLE, ME-LE, ME-LE 
with lagged dependent variable, GEE and GEE with lagged dependent variable respectively. All 
specifications with regard to static panel in Table 4.8 consider the same explanatory variables as we 
have used in our original specifications for LDCs in Eq. 2 and 4. Columns 1, 2 and 4 portrait very 
similar results to those present in Table 4.2 in terms of significance and effect. Export growth rate 
(ExG), net bilateral financial flows (NFF_Bi), net multilateral financial flows (NFF_Mu), ODA, worker 
remittances (Wrr) and exchange rate (XR) shows the similar significant negative effects to the 
estimates before. Specifications 3 and 5 present the dynamic panel estimation employing ME-ML and 
GEE-FD respectively. Both specifications use the same lagged dependent variable and other 
explanatory variables as we used in Eq. 4.  The results show that most of the explanatory variables 
are similar effect as in Table 4.5 and 4.6, in particular, ExG, NFF_Bi, NFF_Mu, Wrr and XR shows the 
similar negative effects. Furthermore, the coefficient of ODA and FDInf show a little variation in 
terms of effect to the estimates before.    
To sum up, we carried out numerous sensitivity checks using alternative estimation techniques, such 
as MLE, ME-ML and GEE.  Almost all of our specifications support the robustness of our estimates 
before.  We therefore conclude that our qualitative specifications are robust with regards to the 
alternative estimation techniques.  
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Table 4.7: Robustness checks of estimation results for OECD-EU donor countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method MLE ME-ML ME-ML GEE GEE-LD 
      
L.LNDODA - - 0.651*** - 0.800*** 
 - - (0.0633) - (0.0443) 
DPD -0.0108** -0.00704* -0.00290 -0.0109** -0.00206 
 (0.00518) (0.00385) (0.00264) (0.00511) (0.00185) 
DOG -0.0366** -0.0427* -0.00158 -0.0364** -0.000151 
 (0.0176) (0.0242) (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0161) 
DGGFB -0.00540 -0.00696*** -0.00199 -0.00539 -0.00112 
 (0.00371) (0.00254) (0.00173) (0.00370) (0.00113) 
lpop 1.322*** 1.426*** 0.515*** 1.320*** 0.310*** 
 (0.169) (0.0921) (0.109) (0.169) (0.0746) 
lgdpc 0.909** 0.584* 0.457** 0.914** 0.316** 
 (0.373) (0.323) (0.226) (0.368) (0.159) 
lue 0.182 -0.259 0.108 0.188 0.0719 
 (0.246) (0.212) (0.145) (0.238) (0.100) 
ltop 1.331*** 1.671*** 0.612*** 1.321*** 0.381*** 
 (0.474) (0.282) (0.214) (0.467) (0.140) 
lrer 0.383** 0.423*** 0.150** 0.381** 0.0873** 
 (0.173) (0.0865) (0.0641) (0.173) (0.0422) 
linf -0.0396 -0.0171 -0.0104 -0.0394 0.0364 
 (0.0596) (0.0899) (0.0681) (0.0590) (0.0649) 
bcdummy -0.0879 -0.171 -0.255** -0.0879 -0.264** 
 (0.104) (0.157) (0.100) (0.103) (0.104) 
      
Observations 111 111 94 111 94 
Donor countries 17 17 17 17 17 
Note: Dependent variable is log of net ODA (LNODA). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) MLE, Maximum Likelihood Estimation for static model (2) ME-ML, Mixed Effects- 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation for static model  (3) ME-ML, Mixed Effects- Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation for dynamic model (4) GEE, Generalized Estimating Equations for static model, (5) GEE-FD, 
Generalized Estimating Equations for dynamic model. 
(Liang and Zeger, 1986)(Liang and Zeger, 1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[41] 
 
Table 4.8: Robustness checks of estimation results for LDCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method MLE ME-ML ME-ML GEE GEE-LD 
      
L.RGPCG - - 0.0989*** - -0.0126 
 - - (0.0326) - (0.0300) 
FDInf 0.0440 0.0338 0.0301 0.0440 0.0315 
 (0.0429) (0.0490) (0.0298) (0.0429) (0.0326) 
ExG -0.00705 -0.00486 -0.00457 -0.00705 -0.00701 
 (0.00542) (0.00826) (0.00502) (0.00542) (0.00449) 
DFoR -4.33e-10 8.72e-11 3.87e-11 -4.33e-10 -7.97e-11 
 (3.16e-10) (4.74e-10) (2.81e-10) (3.16e-10) (2.50e-10) 
TEDS 8.02e-10*** 1.74e-10** -1.21e-10** 8.02e-10*** -6.32e-11 
 (9.08e-11) (7.46e-11) (4.71e-11) (8.95e-11) (6.32e-11) 
CI 1.985** 1.243** 0.558 1.985** 0.610 
 (0.996) (0.557) (0.349) (0.996) (0.510) 
GINI 0.0181 -0.0604 -0.0937*** 0.0181 -0.100** 
 (0.113) (0.0415) (0.0265) (0.112) (0.0421) 
Pop 7.74e-08* 3.73e-08 1.50e-08 7.74e-08* 9.11e-09 
 (4.02e-08) (2.35e-08) (1.53e-08) (4.01e-08) (2.04e-08) 
NFF_Bi -2.14e-09** -3.27e-09*** 1.10e-09 -2.14e-09** -5.44e-11 
 (9.30e-10) (1.23e-09) (7.53e-10) (9.27e-10) (7.22e-10) 
NFF_Mu -2.71e-09** -6.18e-09*** -9.41e-11 -2.71e-09** -1.41e-09 
 (1.34e-09) (1.68e-09) (1.09e-09) (1.34e-09) (1.13e-09) 
MMR -1.297 -1.566** -0.576 -1.297 -0.543 
 (0.799) (0.720) (0.458) (0.799) (0.558) 
AND 0.286** 0.415*** 0.197** 0.286** 0.248** 
 (0.128) (0.156) (0.0976) (0.127) (0.102) 
oda -0.00344*** -0.00145 0.000601 -0.00344*** 1.56e-05 
 (0.000724) (0.000886) (0.000556) (0.000724) (0.000562) 
XR -0.000169 5.37e-05 1.46e-05 -0.000169 5.52e-06 
 (0.000222) (9.32e-05) (5.82e-05) (0.000222) (9.03e-05) 
wrr -3.00e-09*** -5.96e-10*** -1.34e-10 -3.00e-09*** -6.58e-11 
 (2.58e-10) (1.98e-10) (1.25e-10) (2.49e-10) (1.78e-10) 
INF_Mor 0.00701 0.0113 -0.00418 0.00701 0.00380 
 (0.0334) (0.0129) (0.00817) (0.0333) (0.0128) 
fpr 1.560* 2.573*** 0.575 1.560* 0.835 
 (0.899) (0.726) (0.456) (0.897) (0.576) 
      
Observations 371 371 318 371 318 
No. of LDCs 53 53 53 53 53 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth rate (RGPCG). Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) MLE, Maximum Likelihood Estimation for static model (2) ME-ML, 
Mixed Effects- Maximum Likelihood Estimation for static model  (3) ME-ML, Mixed Effects- Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation for dynamic model (4) GEE, Generalized Estimating Equations for static model, (5) 
GEE-FD, Generalized Estimating Equations for dynamic model. 
5 Conclusion 
This research examined the effects of global financial crisis on OECD-DAC EU donor countries ODA 
disbursements to the LDCs and how it affects to the LDCs’ economic development. We employed two 
econometric techniques to answer these questions empirically. Firstly, static panel estimation using 
POLS, FE, RE, FE-AR(1), RE-AR(1), 2SLS-FE, 2SLS-RE and EC2SLS-RE techniques, secondly, dynamic 
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panel GMM estimation using both difference and system estimators. Our studies especially designed 
to deal with the key problems of past literatures considering financial crisis-aid flows and its effect 
on aid recipient countries economic prospects. The static and dynamic panel GMM results shows 
very similar story from the complementary points of view of the donor countries and of the recipient 
countries.  As a robustness checks, we also used three alternative estimation techniques: maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), mixed effects-maximum likelihood (ME-ML) and generalized 
estimating equations (GEE). All robustness checks using these estimation techniques supports our 
original estimation results.  
We find support for our hypotheses that global financial crisis in OECD-EU donor countries declines 
their ODA effort to the LDCs. Consequently it adversely affects through the various transmission 
channels (e.g. ODA disbursements, remittances, bilateral financial flows, export growth) to the LDCs 
economic development. Our findings are robust with the view that the present financial crisis and 
fiscal instability in the OECD-EU donor countries are causes for the significant downside of ODA 
flows to the LDCs. Our results also explore that due to countercyclical role of ODA flows from the 
donors’ largely affect to the LDCs economic development process. Because the recent trends of many 
OECD-EU donor countries reduce ODA flows and concentrate ODA on their countries of interest. 
Thus, it is obvious that the LDCs are severely vulnerable through the recent global financial turmoil, 
which is gradually reduces their ODA, worker remittances, bilateral and multilateral financial flows 
and export growth. Particularly, as ODA is mostly connected with the development activities through 
some important sectors (e.g. infrastructure, health, education, etc) of the LDCs’, thus a sudden cut of 
ODA disbursements is aggravate the problems already imposed by the crisis and further hinder the 
development process i.e. achieving the MDGs of these poor economies as a whole. However, due to 
data limitation of some LDCs, we do not conduct a comprehensive evaluation of different sectors 
effects. Further work would be substantially broaden and deepen in this context.  
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Appendix 
Table A1.  List of Developing Countries and Sample Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tabl
e A2.  
List of OECD Donor Countries and Sample Periods 
 
Country Years Country Years  
Austria 2004-2010 Luxembourg 2004-2010 
Belgium 2004-2010 Netherlands 2004-2010 
Denmark 2004-2010 Norway 2004-2010 
Finland 2004-2010 Portugal 2004-2010 
France 2004-2010 Spain 2004-2010 
Germany 2004-2010 Sweden 2004-2010 
Greece 2004-2010 Switzerland 2004-2010 
Ireland 2004-2010 United Kingdom 2004-2010 
Italy 2004-2010   
Country Years Country Years  
Afghanistan 2004-2010 Malawi 2004-2010 
Angola 2004-2010 Mali 2004-2010 
Bangladesh 2004-2010 Mauritania 2004-2010 
Benin 2004-2010 Mozambique 2004-2010 
Bhutan 2004-2010 Nepal 2004-2010 
Burkina Faso 2004-2010 Niger 2004-2010 
Brandi 2004-2010 Nigeria 2004-2010 
Cambodia 2004-2010 Pakistan 2004-2010 
Central African Rep. 2004-2010 Papua New Guinea 2004-2010 
Chad 2004-2010 Rwanda 2004-2010 
Comoros 2004-2010 Samoa 2004-2010 
Congo, Dem. 2004-2010 Sao Tome & Principe 2004-2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004-2010 Senegal 2004-2010 
Djibouti 2004-2010 Sierra Leone 2004-2010 
Eritrea 2004-2010 Solomon Islands 2004-2010 
Ethiopia 2004-2010 Somalia 2004-2010 
Gambia 2004-2010 Sudan 2004-2010 
Ghana 2004-2010 Tajikistan 2004-2010 
Guinea 2004-2010 Tanzania 2004-2010 
Guinea-Bissau 2004-2010 Togo 2004-2010 
Haiti 2004-2010 Uganda 2004-2010 
Kenya 2004-2010 Uzbekistan 2004-2010 
Kyrgyz Republic 2004-2010 Vanuatu 2004-2010 
Laos 2004-2010 Vietnam 2004-2010 
Lesotho 2004-2010 Yemen 2004-2010 
Liberia 2004-2010 Zambia 2004-2010 
Madagascar 2004-2010   
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Table A3 Description of the Variables and Sources: 
 
 
Variables Short 
name 
Descriptions Sources 
 
Financial crisis variables: 
Aid recipient countries 
GDP per capita growth 
(annual %) 
RGPCG Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant 
local currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files 
Donor countries public 
debt (% of GDP) 
DPD Gross public debt to GDP ratio. Government Net lending (+)/Net 
borrowing (-) under the EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) 
Eurostat Database 
Donor countries output 
gap (% of GDP) 
DOG The difference between the maximum output achievable and the 
actual level of output. 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 90 
Donor countries 
general government 
fiscal balance 
DGGFB Donor countries general government fiscal balance Eurostat database 
Donor countries 
Banking crisis 
BC Banking crisis considered as a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 during the years of banking crises and 0 otherwise. 
Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia (June 2010) database 
Trade Openness (% of 
GDP) 
TOP Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National 
Accounts data files 
Export growth rate ExG Annual export growth rate World Bank Development Indicators database 
Development assistance variables: 
 
Net official 
development assistance 
disbursed by each 
donor 
NDODA Net official development assistance is disbursement flows (net of 
repayment of principal) that meet the DAC definition of ODA and 
are made to countries and territories on the DAC list of aid 
recipients. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database, 
OECD 
Debt forgiveness or 
reduction (current 
US$) 
DFoR Debt forgiveness or reduction shows the change in debt stock due to 
debt forgiveness or reduction. It is derived by subtracting debt 
forgiven and debt stock reduction from debt buyback. Data are in 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database, 
OECD 
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current U.S. dollars. 
Net financial flows, 
bilateral (NFL, current 
US$) 
NFFBi Bilateral debt includes loans from governments and their agencies 
(including central banks), loans from autonomous bodies, and 
direct loans from official export credit agencies. Net flows (or net 
lending or net disbursements) received by the borrower during the 
year are disbursements minus principal repayments. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, Global Development Finance 
Net financial flows, 
multilateral (NFL, 
current US$) 
NFFMu Public and publicly guaranteed multilateral loans include loans and 
credits from the World Bank, regional development banks, and 
other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies. Excluded are 
loans from funds administered by an international organization on 
behalf of a single donor government; these are classified as loans 
from governments. Net flows (or net lending or net disbursements) 
received by the borrower during the year are disbursements minus 
principal repayments. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, Global Development Finance 
Total external debt 
stocks, (DOD, current 
US$) 
TEDS Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in 
foreign currency, goods, or services. It is the sum of public, publicly 
guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, short-term 
debt, and use of IMF credit. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, Global Development Finance database 
 
Other variables: 
 
Foreign direct 
investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) aid 
recipient countries 
FDInf Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of investment to 
acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in 
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and 
short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, World 
Bank, Global Development Finance, and World Bank 
and OECD GDP estimates 
Workers' remittances, 
receipts (BoP, current 
US$) 
WRR Workers' remittances are current transfers by migrants who are 
employed or intend to remain employed for more than a year in 
another economy in which they are considered residents. 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook and data files 
Total population Pop Total population is based on the de facto definition of population. World Bank Development Indicators database 
Unemployment, total UnE Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of 
[50] 
 
(% of  total labor force) work but available for and seeking employment. the Labour Market database 
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual %) 
INF Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the 
annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics and data files. 
Real exchange rate RER Real effective exchange rates based on consumer price indices (Year 
2005=100). An increase denotes depreciation. 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 90 
Exchange rate XR Local currency exchange rate with Dollar (US$) International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics and data files. 
Inequality (GINI   
Index)  
GINI GINI index measures the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from 
a perfectly equal distribution.  Thus a GINI index of 0 represents 
perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
WIDER database and World Bank, Development 
Research Group database 
Financial sector rating 
(1-6) 
FSR CPIA financial sector rating (1=low to 6=high). World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida) 
Corruption index (1-6) CI CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public 
sector rating (1=low to 6=high). 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida) 
Macroeconomic 
management rating (1-
6) 
MMR CPIA macroeconomic management rating (1=low to 6=high). 
Macroeconomic management assesses the monetary, exchange rate, 
and aggregate demand policy framework. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
Aid recipient countries 
people affected by 
disasters 
AND Affected by natural disaster i.e. complex disasters, drought, 
earthquake,  epidemic, flood, storm, volcano etc. 
Emergency events database 
http://www.emdat.be/database 
Mortality rate, infant 
(per 1,000 live births) 
InMF Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 
one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
World Bank Development Indicators database 
Fiscal policy rating fpr Fiscal policy assesses the short- and medium-term sustainability of 
fiscal policy (taking into account monetary and exchange rate policy 
and the sustainability of the public debt) and its impact on growth. 
World Bank Group, CPIA database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/ida). 
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Figure A2: OECD-EU donor countries public debt and government fiscal balance 
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Figure A3: LDCs net bilateral financial flows, worker remittances and debt forgiveness or reduction  
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Figure A3: LDCs net bilateral financial flows, worker remittances and debt forgiveness or reduction (continued) 
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Figure A4: LDCs export growth rate and number natural disaster affect these economics  
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Figure A4: LDCs export growth rate and number natural disaster affect these economics (continued) 
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Table A4: Correlation matrix of LDCs 
 RGPCG FDInf ExG DFoR TEDS CI GINI Pop NFF_Bi NFF_Mu MMR AND oda XR wrr INF_Mor fbr 
RGPCG 1.00                 
FDInf 0.01 1.00                
ExG -0.03 0.05 1.00               
DFoR -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1.00              
TEDS 0.13 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 1.00             
CI 0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.07 -0.13 1.00            
GINI -0.07 -0.02 0.10 -0.08 -0.10 0.22 1.00           
Pop 0.12 -0.11 0.02 -0.20 0.81 -0.07 -0.01 1.00          
NFF_Bi -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.56 0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -0.14 1.00         
NFF_Mu -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.59 0.08 -0.07 0.60 0.19 1.00        
MMR 0.03 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.04 0.42 0.13 0.14 -0.03 0.23 1.00       
AND 0.16 -0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.45 -0.03 -0.10 0.52 0.01 0.38 0.23 1.00      
oda 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.71 0.24 0.01 0.09 0.44 -0.62 0.17 0.15 0.26 1.00     
XR -0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.17 0.12 -0.05 1.00    
wrr -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.25 0.53 0.01 0.08 0.78 -0.27 0.43 0.12 0.30 0.43 0.04 1.00   
INF_Mor 0.07 -0.06 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 -0.18 -0.16 0.05 0.20 -0.08 -0.06 1.00  
fpr 0.09 -0.02 0.08 -0.15 0.09 0.27 0.11 0.27 -0.03 0.34 0.70 0.15 0.23 -0.06 0.24 -0.16 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[57] 
 
Table A5: Correlation matrix of OECD-EU donor countries 
 
 LNDODA DPD DOG DGGFB Lpop lgdpc lue ltop lrer linf bcdummy 
LNDODA 1.0000           
DPD -0.2962 1.0000          
DOG 0.0031 -0.3155 1.0000         
DGGFB -0.0985 0.7798 -0.1377 1.0000        
lpop 0.5217 0.4266 -0.1717 0.5755 1.0000       
lgdpc 0.1788 -0.6841 0.1888 -0.698 -0.5845 1.0000      
lue -0.1186 0.5288 -0.3552 0.5171 0.4669 -0.6842 1.0000     
ltop -0.1478 -0.4455 0.2839 -0.2699 -0.7165 0.6211 -0.4575 1.0000    
lrer 0.1635 -0.3398 0.054 -0.5574 -0.3092 0.3866 -0.3482 0.0057 1.0000   
linf -0.1852 0.1071 0.2602 0.1148 -0.0801 -0.0319 0.0575 0.1261 -0.1617 1.0000  
bcdummy -0.1163 0.1801 -0.0493 0.1925 0.0294 0.0405 0.0745 0.0228 -0.1318 0.1878 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[58] 
 
Table A6 : Dynamic panel estimation results for the LDCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE RE RE IV-FE IV-FE IV-RE IV-RE 
L.RGPCG 0.0989*** 0.0981*** -0.0957** -0.0831** 0.0989*** 0.0981*** -0.00999 -0.0215 -0.0242 -0.0289 
 (0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0372) (0.0366) (0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0510) (0.0497) (0.0476) (0.0468) 
FDInf 0.0301 0.0322 0.0537 0.0410 0.0301 0.0322 0.0438 0.0357 0.0327 0.0353 
 (0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0394) (0.0390) (0.0306) (0.0300) (0.0401) (0.0393) (0.0313) (0.0307) 
ExG -0.00457 -0.00479 -0.00836* -0.00884* -0.00457 -0.00479 -0.00835* -0.00880* -0.00420 -0.00451 
 (0.00516) (0.00502) (0.00466) (0.00453) (0.00516) (0.00502) (0.00471) (0.00455) (0.00528) (0.00515) 
DFoR 0 3.71e-10 -1.02e-10 5.64e-11 0 3.71e-10 -0 1.28e-10 0 3.28e-10 
 (2.89e-10) (3.09e-10) (2.76e-10) (2.92e-10) (2.89e-10) (3.09e-10) (2.80e-10) (2.97e-10) (2.96e-10) (3.17e-10) 
TEDS -1.21e-10** -1.28e-10*** 1.15e-10 1.10e-10 -1.21e-10** -1.28e-10*** -0 0 -1.07e-10** -1.15e-10** 
 (0) (0) (1.25e-10) (1.25e-10) (0) (0) (1.40e-10) (1.39e-10) (0) (0) 
CI 0.558 0.550 0.110 -0.0596 0.558 0.550 -0.0444 -0.167 0.649* 0.637* 
 (0.360) (0.349) (1.079) (1.044) (0.360) (0.349) (1.092) (1.052) (0.369) (0.358) 
GINI -0.0937*** -0.0973*** -0.119 -0.163 -0.0937*** -0.0973*** -0.100 -0.154 -0.108*** -0.113*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.174) (0.170) (0.0273) (0.0265) (0.176) (0.171) (0.0282) (0.0275) 
Pop 1.50e-08 1.28e-08 -8.45e-08 -1.97e-08 1.50e-08 1.28e-08 6.75e-09 3.62e-08 9.54e-09 6.81e-09 
 (1.58e-08) (1.54e-08) (1.89e-07) (1.92e-07) (1.58e-08) (1.54e-08) (1.94e-07) (1.95e-07) (1.62e-08) (1.58e-08) 
NFF_Bi 1.10e-09 1.57e-09** -5.66e-10 -3.49e-10 1.10e-09 1.57e-09** -2.80e-10 -1.35e-10 7.20e-10 1.31e-09 
 (7.75e-10) (7.79e-10) (8.45e-10) (8.23e-10) (7.75e-10) (7.79e-10) (8.62e-10) (8.36e-10) (7.99e-10) (8.00e-10) 
NFF_Mu -9.41e-11 1.32e-10 -2.56e-09** -2.14e-09* -9.41e-11 1.32e-10 -2.32e-09* -1.97e-09 -3.88e-10 -1.64e-10 
 (1.12e-09) (1.09e-09) (1.29e-09) (1.25e-09) (1.12e-09) (1.09e-09) (1.30e-09) (1.26e-09) (1.15e-09) (1.12e-09) 
MMR -0.576 -0.581 -0.132 -0.0552 -0.576 -0.581 -0.195 -0.107 -0.707 -0.711 
 (0.472) (0.459) (0.777) (0.761) (0.472) (0.459) (0.785) (0.766) (0.484) (0.471) 
AND 0.197* 0.141 0.235* 0.246** 0.197* 0.141 0.228* 0.236* 0.218** 0.157 
 (0.100) (0.0996) (0.124) (0.122) (0.100) (0.0996) (0.125) (0.122) (0.103) (0.102) 
oda 0.000601 0.00121** -0.000383 2.55e-05 0.000601 0.00121** -0.000241 0.000153 0.000988* 0.00166*** 
 (0.000573) (0.000593) (0.000708) (0.000710) (0.000573) (0.000593) (0.000718) (0.000717) (0.000595) (0.000618) 
XR 1.46e-05 1.45e-05 -0.000162 -0.000108 1.46e-05 1.45e-05 -0.000115 -7.44e-05 1.33e-05 1.32e-05 
 (5.99e-05) (5.81e-05) (0.000326) (0.000321) (5.99e-05) (5.81e-05) (0.000330) (0.000323) (6.12e-05) (5.95e-05) 
wrr -1.34e-10 -9.55e-11 0 6.97e-11 -1.34e-10 -9.55e-11 2.95e-10 2.80e-10 -9.61e-11 -0 
 (1.28e-10) (1.26e-10) (4.68e-10) (4.61e-10) (1.28e-10) (1.26e-10) (4.85e-10) (4.77e-10) (1.32e-10) (1.29e-10) 
INF_Mor -0.00418 -0.00629 0.122* 0.0222 -0.00418 -0.00629 0.130** 0.0326 -0.00453 -0.00724 
 (0.00842) (0.00822) (0.0628) (0.0896) (0.00842) (0.00822) (0.0635) (0.0903) (0.00860) (0.00843) 
fpr 0.575 0.554 0.580 0.639 0.575 0.554 0.631 0.698 0.725 0.695 
 (0.470) (0.457) (0.868) (0.846) (0.470) (0.457) (0.878) (0.851) (0.482) (0.469) 
Year dummy  yes  Yes  yes  yes  Yes 
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Table A6: (continued) 
Observations 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 318 
R2 0.137 0.202 0.106 0.182       
No. of LDCs 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
 
 
Table A7: Dynamic panel estimation results for OECD-EU donor countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Estimation method POLS POLS FE FE RE RE IV-FE IV-FE  IV-RE IV-RE  
L.LNDODA 0.651*** 0.661*** -0.0257 -0.0290 0.626*** 0.584*** 0.431 0.554 0.514 0.663*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0692) (0.102) (0.109) (0.0702) (0.0772) (0.571) (0.490) (0.468) (0.219) 
DPD -0.00290 -0.00252 -0.0128* -0.0142 -0.00311 -0.00311 -0.0120 -0.0102 -0.00582 -0.00251 
 (0.00283) (0.00293) (0.00677) (0.00879) (0.00296) (0.00336) (0.00781) (0.0111) (0.00513) (0.00336) 
DOG -0.00158 0.0200 -0.00604 0.0188 -0.00240 0.0192 0.00158 0.0233 -0.00258 0.0210 
 (0.0179) (0.0307) (0.0213) (0.0343) (0.0180) (0.0310) (0.0261) (0.0418) (0.0314) (0.0324) 
DGGFB -0.00199 -0.00203 -0.00211 -0.00184 -0.00210 -0.00242 0.00175 0.00115 -0.00158 -0.00199 
 (0.00186) (0.00188) (0.00542) (0.00581) (0.00195) (0.00218) (0.00779) (0.00745) (0.00466) (0.00242) 
lpop 0.515*** 0.502*** 4.068 7.472 0.547*** 0.605*** 1.490 2.854 0.661 0.498 
 (0.116) (0.120) (4.991) (5.579) (0.121) (0.135) (6.519) (7.733) (0.657) (0.321) 
lgdpc 0.457* 0.449* 0.871 1.715 0.480* 0.535* 0.658 1.156 0.677 0.457 
 (0.242) (0.265) (0.663) (1.446) (0.252) (0.307) (0.801) (1.812) (0.452) (0.303) 
lue 0.108 0.151 0.559* 0.542 0.114 0.177 0.517 0.633 0.280 0.164 
 (0.155) (0.160) (0.307) (0.328) (0.161) (0.180) (0.354) (0.404) (0.223) (0.180) 
ltop 0.612*** 0.604** 0.111 1.170 0.647*** 0.712*** 0.432 1.649 0.717 0.599 
 (0.229) (0.233) (1.014) (1.598) (0.240) (0.268) (1.223) (1.978) (0.816) (0.408) 
lrer 0.150** 0.146** -0.169 0.106 0.160** 0.177** -0.204 -0.439 0.212 0.145 
 (0.0686) (0.0705) (0.834) (0.963) (0.0721) (0.0824) (0.954) (1.249) (0.224) (0.113) 
linf -0.0104 -0.00627 -0.00725 0.0410 -0.0155 -0.0192 -0.0347 -0.0321 -0.0486 -0.0123 
 (0.0729) (0.0890) (0.0722) (0.0938) (0.0728) (0.0912) (0.0891) (0.128) (0.0702) (0.0919) 
bcdummy -0.255** -0.305** -0.124 -0.0701 -0.251** -0.285** -0.211 -0.294 -0.223* -0.305** 
 (0.107) (0.136) (0.101) (0.136) (0.107) (0.134) (0.157) (0.245) (0.130) (0.143) 
Year dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
R2 0.924 0.927 0.200 0.242       
Donor countries 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
